2022
- Davide Fassio, “What the Doctor Should Do: Perspectivist Duties for Objectivists about Ought”. Philosophical Studies. Link
- Guowei LAI, “The Debate between Objectivism and Perspectivism: Objections to Lord’s Arguments” Foreign Philosophy (外国哲学). (in Chinese)
- Jie GAO, ‘Credal Sensitivism: Threshold vs. Credence-one’, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. Link
- Jie GAO, “Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis“, Mind & Language. Link
2021
- Davide Fassio, Jie GAO, “Do We Really Need a Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?”, Synthese.
- Davide Fassio, “In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism”. In C. Kyriacou and K. Wallbridge (Eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered.
- Davide Fassio, “Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration”, Ethics.
- Guowei Lai,“The Debate between Evidentialism and Pragmatism: Rinard’s Objection to Kelly’s and Shah’s Arguments“, Studies in Dialectics of Nature (自然辩证法研究). (in Chinese)
- Jie GAO, ‘Self-Deception and Pragmatic Encroachment: A Dilemma for Epistemic Rationality’, Ratio.
2020
- Davide Fassio, “Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief”, Dialogue.
- Davide Fassio, Jie Gao, Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence, Theoria.
- Davide Fassio, “Moderate Skeptical Invariantism”, Erkenntnis.
- Davide Fassio, “On the Generality Argument for the Knowledge Norm”, Synthese.
- Davide Fassio, “Les raisons épistémiques et la perspective du sujet : quelques réflexions sur la notion de raison épistémique dans l’oeuvre de Skorupski”. In Raisons. La question méta-éthique : autour de l’œuvre de John Skorupski. B. Langlet et J.-M. Monnoyer (eds.).
- Davide Fassio, “Sur la correction doxastique comme ideal de la raison”, Klesis – La philosophie de Pascal Engel (ed. J. H. Vollet).
- Jie GAO, ‘Default Assumption, Hinge Commitment and the Closure Principle’ (默认假定，枢轴承诺与闭合原则), Journal of Dialectics of Nature(自然辩证法通讯). (in Chinese)
2019
- Davide Fassio, “Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?”, Philosophical Studies.
- Davide Fassio, “On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have”, Ratio.
- Jie GAO, ‘Credal Pragmatism’, Philosophical Studies.
- Jie GAO, ‘Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-stakes Cases’, Episteme.
Before 2019
- Davide Fassio, “Passing the Epistemic Buck” (with A. Meylan), in McHugh C., Way J., Whiting D. (eds.) Metaepistemology, 2018, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity”, European Journal of Philosophy, 2017, 25 (4), 1084-1106.
- Davide Fassio, “Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?”, Philosophical Studies, 2017, 174 (9), 2137-2166.
- Davide Fassio, Introduction to the Synthese Special issue Truth and Epistemic Norms (with J. Dutant and A. Meylan), Synthese, 2017, 194 (5), 1427–1431.
- Jie GAO, ‘Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa)’, Synthese, 2017, 194 (6): 1901-1917.
- Jie GAO, ‘Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute?’ (with Mikkel Gerken and Stephen Ryan). In J. Ichikawa (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Contextualism, 2017, New York, Routledge, 81-93.
- Davide Fassio, “A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism”, Philosophical Papers, 2016, 45 (3), 343-364.
- Davide Fassio, “Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards” in M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, 2016, DeGruyter. Pages 165-184.
- Davide Fassio, “Une explication instrumentale de la relation entre assertion et connaissance”, in J. Chevalier and B. Gaultier, La connaissance et ses raisons, 2016, Collège de France, Paris (invited).