• Davide Fassio, “What the Doctor Should Do: Perspectivist Duties for Objectivists about Ought”. Philosophical Studies. Link
  • Guowei LAI, “The Debate between Objectivism and Perspectivism: Objections to Lord’s ArgumentsForeign Philosophy (外国哲学). (in Chinese)
  • Jie GAO, ‘Credal Sensitivism: Threshold vs. Credence-one’, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. Link
  • Jie GAO, “Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis“, Mind & Language. Link


  • Davide Fassio, Jie GAO, “Do We Really Need a Knowledge-Based Decision Theory?”, Synthese.
  • Davide Fassio, “In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism”. In C. Kyriacou and K. Wallbridge (Eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered.
  • Davide Fassio, “Perspectivism, Accessibility and the Failure of Conjunction Agglomeration”, Ethics.
  • Guowei Lai,“The Debate between Evidentialism and Pragmatism: Rinard’s Objection to Kelly’s and Shah’s Arguments“, Studies in Dialectics of Nature (自然辩证法研究). (in Chinese)
  • Jie GAO, ‘Self-Deception and Pragmatic Encroachment: A Dilemma for Epistemic Rationality’, Ratio.


  • Davide Fassio, “Justification, Conformity, and the Norm of Belief”, Dialogue.
  • Davide Fassio, Jie Gao, Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence, Theoria.
  • Davide Fassio, “Moderate Skeptical Invariantism”, Erkenntnis.
  • Davide Fassio, “On the Generality Argument for the Knowledge Norm”, Synthese.
  • Davide Fassio, “Les raisons épistémiques et la perspective du sujet : quelques réflexions sur la notion de raison épistémique dans l’oeuvre de Skorupski”. In Raisons. La question méta-éthique : autour de l’œuvre de John Skorupski. B. Langlet et J.-M. Monnoyer (eds.).
  • Davide Fassio, “Sur la correction doxastique comme ideal de la raison”, Klesis – La philosophie de Pascal Engel (ed. J. H. Vollet).
  • Jie GAO, ‘Default Assumption, Hinge Commitment and the Closure Principle’ (默认假定,枢轴承诺与闭合原则), Journal of Dialectics of Nature(自然辩证法通讯). (in Chinese)


  • Davide Fassio, “Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?”, Philosophical Studies.
  • Davide Fassio, “On correctly responding to all decisive reasons we have”, Ratio.
  • Jie GAO,  ‘Credal Pragmatism’, Philosophical Studies.
  • Jie GAO, ‘Against the Iterated Knowledge Account of High-stakes Cases’, Episteme.

Before 2019

  1. Davide Fassio, “Passing the Epistemic Buck” (with A. Meylan), in McHugh C., Way J., Whiting D. (eds.) Metaepistemology, 2018, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
  2. Davide Fassio, “Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity”, European Journal of Philosophy, 2017, 25 (4), 1084-1106.
  3. Davide Fassio, “Is There an Epistemic Norm of Practical Reasoning?”, Philosophical Studies, 2017, 174 (9), 2137-2166.
  4. Davide Fassio, Introduction to the Synthese Special issue Truth and Epistemic Norms (with J. Dutant and A. Meylan), Synthese, 2017, 194 (5), 1427–1431.
  5. Jie GAO, ‘Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa)’, Synthese, 2017, 194 (6): 1901-1917.
  6. Jie GAO, ‘Does Contextualism Hinge on a Methodological Dispute?’ (with Mikkel Gerken and Stephen Ryan). In J. Ichikawa (Ed.), Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Contextualism, 2017, New York, Routledge, 81-93.
  7. Davide Fassio, “A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism”, Philosophical Papers, 2016, 45 (3), 343-364.
  8. Davide Fassio, “Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards” in M. Grajner and P. Schmechtig (Eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms, and Goals, 2016, DeGruyter. Pages 165-184.
  9. Davide Fassio, “Une explication instrumentale de la relation entre assertion et connaissance”, in J. Chevalier and B. Gaultier, La connaissance et ses raisons, 2016, Collège de France, Paris (invited).
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